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PROMOTING INNOVATION COMPETITION THROUGH
THE ASPEN/KODAK RULE
Jonathan B. Baker*
This article is about the design of an antitrust rule. The central
question is whether antitrust should employ a structured or truncated
analysis rather than an unstructured review of the reasonableness of defen-
dant's conduct in evaluating a monopolization allegation. This type of
question frequently arises in thinking about Sherman Act § 1;' this article
considers the question with respect to Sherman Act § 2 doctrine.
The project of identifying appropriate truncated judicial decision
rules is consistent with an economic approach to antitrust enforcement.
Indeed, Chicago school commentators have embraced it by proposing new
per se rules or structured decision rules intended to make antitrust law
more economically rational.2 The tradeoffs involved in choosing between
truncated and unstructured review can be set forth briefly. All truncated
rules amount to instructing courts not to listen to certain kinds of
evidence.3 Their use thus raises the possibility that the court will get the
answer wrong.4 And there is a fairness concern: why not look at evidence
that one party thinks would be relevant? The answer may be that it could
be very costly to consider that evidence, and doing so may not alter the
outcome. That is, the additional evidence may be difficult to uncover, ex-
pensive for other parties to confront in an adversarial setting, and hard for
a fact-finder to evaluate-and in the end, the court's decision may be un-
likely to vary from the outcome that would have arisen without consider-
ing it. In short, in some cases bright-line rules can reduce the transactions
costs of operating the judicial system without markedly increasing the
likelihood or costs of judicial errors.5 The key to developing good trun-
* Washington College of Law, American University, and formerly Director, Bureau of Eco-
nomics, Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Commission
or any individual Commissioner. The author is indebted to Stephen Calkins, Scott Hansen, Daniel
O'Brien, David Reiffen, Steven Salop, Charles Thomas, and Gregory Vistnes.
I See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Re-
straints, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 733 (1991).
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984) (proposing
decision "filters" to identify practices that antitrust law should not challenge); Richard A. Posner, The
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 6
(1981).
3 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with
Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165 (1988).
4 Two kinds of errors may occur: incorrectly finding liability and incorrectly not finding liabil-
ity. The concern is that either or both types of errors may be more likely when the fact-finder's infor-
mation is incomplete.
5 Bright-line rules also have important benefits in providing guidance to firms and generalist
judges on how to apply the antitrust laws and in educating the public.
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cated rules is to base them on readily observable conduct whose presence
or absence is highly correlated with the conclusion a court would reach
were it to conduct a full analysis.6
The truncated rule discussed in this article was established in two
Supreme Court monopolization decisions, Aspen Skiing v. Aspen High-
lands Skiing Corp. ("Aspen Skiing")7 and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc. ("Kodak").8 The rule may be stated as follows: a
firm with monopoly power violates Sherman Act § 2 if it excludes9 rivals
from the monopolized market by restricting a complementary or collabo-
rative relationship without an adequate business justification. Section I
below highlights that the Aspen/Kodak rule does not require proof of harm
to competition; harm is inferred if the dominant firm exploits a comple-
mentary or collaborative relationship to exclude and the dominant firm's
proffered business justification is insufficient.
A court can thus apply the AspenKodak rule by looking at two
readily observable factors--exclusion that exploits a complementary or
collaborative relationship and the absence of a satisfactory business justifi-
cation-without taking on the task of evaluating harm to competition. The
harm to competition inquiry is likely to be especially difficult when the
effects would mainly be prospective. Section II explains why a rule based
on these two factors is likely to promote innovation in industries with a
dominant firm where innovation competition is effectively "winner-take-
all" and where fringe rivals are in a collaborative or complementary (as
well as competitive) relationship with the dominant firm.'" Winner-take-all
6 Baker, supra note 1, at 740 n.29; accord Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission
and the Rule of Reason: In Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 776 (1998); see
also C. Frederick Beckner M11 & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST
L.J. 41 (1999) (highlighting advantages of basing judicial decisions on information that is inexpensive
to collect).
7 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
8 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
9 "Exclusion," as a term of art in monopolization doctrine, does not require that the excluded
firm exit from the market. The excluded firm need only be weakened significantly by the monopolist's
conduct, as happened to the plaintiff in Aspen Skiing and many of the plaintiffs in Kodak In short, the
term "exclusion" is properly understood as referring to a practice that "raises rival's costs," either
directly or indirectly through foreclosing a rival from inexpensive access to customers (thus reducing
the rival's demand). See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in
Antitrust Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 241, 249 (1987); cf 3 PHaLiP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW I 650a (rev. ed. 1996) (in defining exclusion, the focus should be on the potential
benefit of the conduct to the monopolist, not the degree of foreclosure of the impaired rival); id. 65 lc
(exclusionary behavior means conduct other than competition on the merits "capable of making a
significant contribution to creating or maintaining monopoly power") (emphasis added).
10 The markets where innovation competition is winner-take-all and collaboration among rivals
is common may include elements of the computing and communications industries, where government
charges of unlawful monopolization have recently made headlines. This article will not, however,
discuss the ongoing antitrust litigation involving Microsoft or Intel. See, e.g., United States v. Micro-
soft, No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998); In re Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9288 (filed June 8,
1998).
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innovation competition will likely occur, for example, when intellectual
property protections and network externalities are both strong and buyers
have a low demand for variety.'2 In such industries, the Aspen/Kodak rule
encourages fringe firm innovation (by forbidding certain dominant firm
tactics that could substantially reduce the returns to new products intro-
duced by fringe firms) without markedly reducing dominant firm incen-
tives to innovate (because those incentives are driven mainly by the large
winner-take-all prize). The Aspen/Kodak rule thus proscribes dominant
firm conduct that would likely be found to reduce innovation if evidence
of harm to competition were considered.
The type of industry considered in Section II constitutes only one
area of application for the AspenKodak rule. This was not the type of in-
dustry at stake in the two cases in which the rule emerged, but it is worthy
of special consideration because the stakes can be high when innovation
incentives are at issue.13 Section 1II considers whether the application of
the Aspen/Kodak rule is likely to foster competition in other types of in-
dustries.
I. THE ASPEN/KODAK LEGAL RULE
A. Aspen Skiing and Kodak
As a matter of black letter law, the offense of monopolization has
two elements: (1) proof of monopoly power and (2) demonstration of its
"willful acquisition or maintenance ... as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident."14 The second component of the offense is commonly
referred to as the "bad act" or "deliberateness" element. The Supreme
I I Network externalities arise when each customer's valuation of a product or service increases
with the number of other customers who purchase it. For example, telephone service is more valuable
to everyone when most people in town have such service than it would be if few people in town were
connected to the network. This effect can also arise without communication, in markets where goods
have complements (like "hardware" and "software"); under such circumstances, the network external-
ities have been termed "virtual." Here, each customer's purchase of a product or service leads to in-
creased purchases of the complement; with economies of scale in the production of the complement,
the valuation of the first product to the next customer rises as the first product's sales increase. See
generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULEs 13-14, 183-84 (1999); Mark A.
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479
(1998). Network externalities tend to generate a winner-take-all competition in which the market "tips"
to favor one firm. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra, at 176.
12 Seller scale economies could also generate winner-take-all innovation competition.
13 Thus, the consequences of antitrust rules for incentives to innovate were a major concern of a
recent Federal Trade Commission staff report. 1 FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST
CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (May 1996) re-
printed in Trade Reg. Reports (CCH) No. 424 Extra Edition (June 11, 1996).
14 United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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Court's Aspen Skiing and Kodak decisions set up a truncated inquiry for
identifying a bad act.15
The Aspen Skiing litigation arose out of a change in the way the
Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co.), which controlled three downhill skiing
mountains in Aspen, Colorado, dealt with the Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp. (Highlands), which owned the only other downhill skiing mountain
in town. In brief, for years Ski Co. and Highlands had together offered
skiers a six-day, four-mountain ski ticket, allowing skiers access to all the
mountains in Aspen at a discount from the daily rate, and dividing the
revenue among the firms based on a survey of ski area usage among multi-
area pass-holders. Thus, Highlands was a collaborator with Ski Co. as well
as a competitor; Highlands' product was a demand complement to Ski
Co.'s product in producing the all-Aspen ski ticket.
In 1978, Ski Co. told Highlands that it was unwilling to continue
offering a four-area ticket unless Highlands accepted a fixed percentage of
revenues considerably below Highlands' historical average based on us-
age. This proposal was unacceptable to Highlands, and Ski Co. instead
sold a multi-area weekly ticket limited to the three mountains it
controlled.16 Without participating in a convenient all-Aspen ticket, High-
lands effectively became a day ski area in a destination market, and was
placed at a disadvantage in attracting the patronage of the many skiers who
came to Aspen from far away and stayed for a week. Highlands' share of
the market for downhill skiing services in Aspen declined steadily over the
next four years to about half the previous level.
Highlands brought suit alleging that Ski Co.'s conduct violated the
antitrust laws. The case was tried to a jury, which found Ski Co. guilty of
monopolization under Sherman Act § 2. The district court denied Ski Co.'s
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and awarded damages.
The lower court decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit and then af-
firmed in 1985 by the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision authored
by Justice Stevens (with Justice White not participating).
The Supreme Court did not review the jury finding that Ski Co.
was a monopolist in the market for downhill skiing services in Aspen; the
Court focused its attention on whether Ski Co.'s effective termination of
the all-Aspen ticket was unlawful conduct by a monopolist. In doing so,
15 These decisions have been widely discussed, but most of the attention has gone to issues other
than the legal rule governing the conduct of a firm exercising monopoly power. In both cases, for
example, the Court's definition of the relevant market has been questioned. Kodak has also led to
debates over the contours of tying law and the role of imperfect information and locked-in customers
in antitrust analysis.
16 Ski Co. also discontinued offering a 3-day, 3-area ski ticket for one season. It later reinstated
this ticket, but without publicity or a discount off the daily rate. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 593 & 593 n.13 (1985).
[VOL. 7:3
PROMOTING INNOVATION COMPETITION
the Court was required to construe the facts in a light most favorable to
Highlands. It pointed out that Ski Co.'s conduct was a significant market-
place event, emphasizing that "the monopolist elected to make an impor-
tant change in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive
market and had persisted for years."' 17 The Court concluded that this be-
havior was unlawfully exclusionary, rather than a legitimate business
practice, for several reasons: Highlands' market share had declined; the
four-area ticket that Ski Co. had effectively eliminated was superior in
quality, from the point of view of consumers, to the three-area ticket that
replaced it; and, "perhaps most significant[ly], . . . Ski Co. did not per-
suade the jury that its conduct was justified by any normal business pur-
pose." 8 Indeed, Ski Co. "fail[ed] to offer any efficiency justification what-
ever for its pattern of conduct." 9 The Court found this evidence sufficient
to support the inference "that the monopolist made a deliberate effort to
discourage its customers from doing business with its smaller rival" and
"that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was
willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange
for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival."20
As with Aspen Skiing, the Kodak case emerged out of a change in
a firm's business policies that harmed rivals by exploiting a relationship
involving product complements. The Eastman Kodak Company ("Kodak")
manufactured and sold photocopiers and micrographic equipment. It also
sold service and replacement parts for its equipment. For several years,
Kodak had sold replacement parts to independent service organizations
(ISOs) and to customers obtaining service from ISOs. The ISOs were ri-
vals of Kodak in providing service, but they were also distributors of Ko-
dak parts; thus the ISOs and Kodak were "complementors" (sellers of de-
mand complements), as well as competitors. The litigation arose out of
Kodak's efforts to deny parts to ISOs, making it more difficult for ISOs to
compete with Kodak in servicing Kodak equipment. Many ISOs were
forced out of business, while others lost substantial revenue.
The ISOs filed suit, claiming that Kodak had unlawfully tied the
sale of service for Kodak machines to the sale of parts in violation of
Sherman Act § 1 and that Kodak had unlawfully monopolized the sale of
service for Kodak machines in violation of Sherman Act § 2. After brief
discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Kodak. On
review, in which facts were construed in a light most favorable to the
17 id. at 603.
18 Id. at 608.
19 Id. The Court pointed out that Ski Co.'s claim, that a multi-mountain ticket shared by more
than one firm could not be properly monitored, was contradicted by the prior experience in Aspen and
by Ski Co.'s successful participation in interchangeable lift tickets in other multimountain areas. Nor
was another claim, that Highlands offered an inferior product, convincing. See id.
20 Id. at 610.
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ISOs, the Ninth Circuit reversed. In 1992, a Supreme Court majority of six
agreed with the Ninth Circuit, and the case returned to the district court for
trial. The three dissenting Justices had concerns unrelated to the formula-
tion of monopolization doctrine. Indeed, they defended the importance of
Sherman Act § 2 and emphasized that conduct that would be acceptable
for most firms may raise antitrust concerns when undertaken by a mo-
nopolist.2 '
Most of the Supreme Court majority's opinion was devoted to ty-
ing issues. When it turned to the monopolization claim, the Court first
concluded, based largely on its prior analysis of tying, that the facts could
establish that Kodak had monopoly power in two relevant product mar-
kets: parts for Kodak equipment and service for Kodak equipment.
Moreover, the Court found that the ISOs had presented evidence from
which a court could find that Kodak adopted exclusionary parts and serv-
ice policies in order to acquire or maintain monopoly power. With these
findings, according to the Court, "liability turns . . . on whether 'valid
business reasons' can explain Kodak's actions. 22 Although Kodak prof-
fered three business justifications, the Court found that factual questions
existed about the "validity and sufficiency" of each, making summary
judgment inappropriate. 23 Thus, "[n]one of Kodak's asserted business jus-
tifications ... are sufficient to prove that Kodak is 'entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law' on respondents' § 2 claim."'24
B. Truncated Analysis of "Bad Act"
Not everyone was convinced that the Court was establishing
Sherman Act § 2 doctrine when Aspen Skiing was handed down. But
21 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined
through a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws-or that
might even be viewed as procompetitive-can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a
monopolist."). The dissent challenged the majority's conclusion regarding monopolization only with
respect to the finding of monopoly power; the dissent did not need to discuss the majority's analysis of
exclusion and did not choose to do so.
22 Id. at 483.
23 Id. The first was to promote interbrand equipment competition by allowing Kodak to stress
the quality of its service. The Court concluded that a trier of fact could have found this justification
pretextual. The second was to reduce Kodak's inventory costs. Here, the Court observed that Kodak's
actions seemed inconsistent with the claimed justification; most of the challenged conduct would not
have reduced Kodak's need to inventory parts. Finally, Kodak claimed it needed to prevent ISOs from
free-riding on Kodak's capital investment in equipment, parts and service. The Court rejected this
argument on the grounds that the ISOs were also investing in the activities that would maintain Ko-
dak's reputation for quality (such as worker training and investment in parts inventories), and that the
ISOs failure to enter the equipment and parts markets cannot constitute free-riding. Id.
24 Id. at 485-86.
25 Judge Posner read the case "narrowly" and questioned whether "it stands for any principle
beyond its unusual facts." Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union Tel., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir.
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such a narrow interpretation of Aspen Skiing does not survive Kodak.2 6
The analytical route toward finding that the facts (construed to benefit the
original plaintiff) could support a monopolization charge was similar in
each case. The Court first found that the defendant had monopoly power in
a relevant market and focused its attention on whether the defendant's
conduct satisfied the "bad act" requirement of monopolization doctrine.
The legal analysis of that question in the two decisions shares three key
features.
First, the Court found that a rival (or rivals) was substantially ex-
cluded from that market by defendant's conduct, in the sense that the rival
was weakened significantly (by a reduction in demand or increase in costs)
or forced to exit.27 Thus, Highlands, the plaintiff in Aspen Skiing, was
harmed but not forced out, and some of the ISO plaintiffs in Kodak were
harmed but remained in business while other ISO plaintiffs exited from the
market.
Second, in both cases the Court found that the monopolist ex-
cluded its rival or rivals from the market where the two competed by ex-
ploiting another relationship between the two, either a collaborative or
complementary one.28 In Aspen Skiing, Ski Co. and Highlands collaborated
on an all-Aspen ticket until Ski Co. chose to exclude its rival.29 In Kodak,
1986) (Posner, J.). He divided the relevant precedents into two classes: monopolistic refusal-to-deal
cases and no-duty-to-help-competitors cases. The essential feature of the former, where he said mo-
nopolization may be found, is "a monopoly supplier's discriminating against a customer because the
customer has decided to compete with it." Id. at 377. Although Posner said Aspen Skiing is "not a
conventional monopoly-refusal-to-deal case" because the rival ski mountain "was never a customer" of
the defendant ("the skiers are the customers") that distinction is unconvincing. Id. Ski Co. and High-
lands, as sellers of products that were complements (in an all-Aspen ski package) as well as substitutes,
were in essentially the same economic relationship as competitors who were also customers. (Dis-
tributors and other customers of the sellers of intermediate goods provide complementary services to
goods production from the standpoint of the ultimate consumer.) Posner also recognized that Aspen
Skiing employed lack-of-business justification as evidence of anticompetitive effect-that is, con-
ducted a truncated analysis by which anticompetitive effect was inferred--though his suggestion that
this evidence must be "conjoined with other evidence" is dictum given that he was able to decide the
case before him merely by finding a clear business justification. Id. at 378.
Professor Areeda too sought to limit Aspen Skiing's reach, mainly to discourage an interpre-
tation that would permit liability to be based solely on an intent to exclude. Phillip Areeda, Essential
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTrTRUST L.J. 841, 848-50 (1989).
26 See Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 304 (1993) (After Kodak, "Aspen will be harder to limit; it (and Kodak) will be a
challenge to interpret and apply.").
27 Exit is not required. See supra note 9.
28 Firms selling demand complements, the situation in Kodak, are tacitly collaborators because
they must recognize that an increase in the demand for one product raises the demand for the other.
Each knows that its marketplace success depends on the demand for the "system" of complementary
products taken as a whole, just as members of a formal collaboration understand that they sink or swim
together. As a result, sellers of demand complements may coordinate product design and marketing, as
well as new product development, much as formal collaborators often do.
29 Judge Posner reads Aspen Skiing to stand possibly for the principle "that a monopolist may be
guilty of monopolization if it refuses to cooperate with a competitor in circumstances where some
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the ISOs distributed Kodak parts while competing with Kodak on service,
until Kodak denied them access to parts. The vertical (complementary or
collaborative) relationship between the firms provided the plaintiff a prior
business relationship with the monopolist that could be impaired;30 a
change in prior conduct was a feature of both cases.31 The horizontal
(competitive) relationship between the firms gave rise to the potential
32harm to competition.
Finally, in each case, the Court did not consider effect on compe-
tition in determining whether the monopolization offense could be found.
Harm to competition was effectively inferred in each case from the ab-
sence of a valid and sufficient business justification. This inference is most
clear in Kodak, where the Court did not consider effect on competition
(harm to buyers). 33 While the Court in Aspen Skiing did observe that the
cooperation is indispensable to effective competition." Olympia Equip., 797 F.2d at 379. This formu-
lation highlights that the rival is both a competitor and collaborator with the monopolist.
30 It does not appear to matter whether the complementary products are sold by the monopolist,
the excluded firm or both. The focus is on whether the two firms are simultaneously rivals (in the
monopolized product) and collaborators (in the sense that at least one sells a complement to the mo-
nopolized product), so there is a complementary relationship that the monopolist can exploit to ex-
clude.
31 In the wake of Aspen Skiing and Kodak, a change in prior conduct has become important pro-
plaintiff evidence. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 7.5, at 265-66 (1994)
(recommending that Aspen Skiing and Kodak be applied only to the cancellation of participation in a
pre-existing joint venture, not to create a new obligation to deal where no arrangement had existed
before); Daniel M. Wall, Aftermarket Monopoly Five Years After Kodak, ANTITRUST, Summer 1997,
32, 37 ("As substantive law, Kodak's lasting significance may be to carry forward antitrust's peculiar
animosity, usually associated with Aspen Skiing, towards changes in business policies."); Michael S.
Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REv. 336, 360
n.129 (1993) (Aspen Skiing establishes that a monopolist may not change, "without valid business
justification, an established course of cooperative dealing with a rival."); SMS Sys. Maintenance
Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d. 166, 168 (D. Mass. 1998) (no liability without
change in conduct).
32 All market power is ultimately the result of a reduction in output (or other dimension of
competition) by a monopolist or among horizontal rivals within a market, although market power can
be obtained through non-horizontal exclusionary conduct. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical
Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses,
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517 (1996).
33 In both cases, the monopolist's conduct excluded all of its rivals; absent an efficiency justifi-
cation, consumers would almost surely have been harmed. But the Court never makes this observation,
and thus cannot be said to have inferred effect on competition from market structure. Nor did the
Kodak opinion's earlier discussion of tying supply the missing effects evidence for either monopoliza-
tion claim (equipment or service) in that case. In analyzing the plaintiff ISOs' tying claim, the Court
noted that service prices rose for Kodak customers. This could perhaps be construed as evidence that
buyers were harmed by practices that maintained Kodak's monopoly in service (when interpreted in
conjunction with the Court's observation that Kodak had never asserted that it prices equipment or
parts subcompetitively). But the Court did not draw this conclusion; its observation about prices was
instead part of an explanation of why defendant Kodak was not entitled to a legal presumption that it
could not exercise market power in the parts and service "aftermarkets" if the equipment market is
competitive. Thus, whether or not the majority thought buyers were harmed, getting higher prices and
lower quality, it did not consider proof of harm to buyers to be an element of the monopolization
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defendant's exclusionary conduct reduced the quality of the products
available to customers, and referred to that inquiry as consideration of the
impact of defendant's conduct on consumers, this evidence went toward
establishing that the jury could have found that defendant sacrificed short
term profits in order to reduce long run competition-and thus toward
finding that defendant had no business justification.34 Moreover, regardless
of what the Court intended in Aspen Skiing, Kodak read the earlier deci-
sion not to require proof of an effect on competition. The Kodak opinion
states that once respondent presented evidence that the defendant took
exclusionary action to maintain its monopoly (and thus, given the proce-
dural posture, once exclusion to maintain monopoly was demonstrated),
liability then "turns" on whether valid business reasons can explain defen-
dant's action-citing Aspen Skiing as primary authority.35
These three features of the analysis of "bad act" in Aspen Skiing
and Kodak establish the elements of the Aspen/Kodak rule: a firm with
monopoly power violates Sherman Act § 2 if it excludes rivals from the
monopolized market by restricting a complementary or collaborative rela-
tionship without an adequate business justification.
C. Open Questions and a Settled Issue
The Supreme Court did not directly explicate this rule as doctrine
in Aspen Skiing and Kodak, so many of the elements of the rule are not
discussed in detail and must be inferred.36 Consequently, a number of im-
offense.
34 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985). In addition,
the Aspen Skiing opinion explains its statement that impact on consumers is "relevant" to the charac-
terization of defendant's conduct as exclusionary by a passage from the Areeda and Turner treatise that
defines exclusionary behavior as conduct that not only impairs the opportunities of rivals, "but also..
. either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way." Id. at
605 & n.32. This definition focuses on business justification (and less restrictive alternatives), not
harm to competition.
For an alternative reading of Aspen Skiing as requiring plaintiff to show harm to consumers,
see HOVENKAMP, supra note 31, at 264. Professor Hokenkamp can be found on both sides of the
argument, as he had previously read Aspen Skiing to suggest that the Sherman Act is violated by con-
duct that raises a rival's costs without creating an efficiency, apparently without need for proof of
market power. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985). In
that article, Professor Hovenkamp defines an efficient exclusionary practice as one that increases
industry-wide demand, thus following Aspen Skiing in looking at the impact of defendant's conduct on
buyers as a basis for evaluating the adequacy of the proffered business justification (rather than as an
element to be demonstrated separately). Id.
35 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 483. The Court also relied upon United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Alcoa").
36 Professor Calkins calls the wording of the test applied in Kodak "indeterminate" and notes
that the Court was "maddeningly silent.., on burdens of proof." Calkins, supra note 26, at 304. Cf.
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183-84 (1st Cir. 1994) ("It is not
entirely clear whether the Court in Aspen Skiing merely intended to create a category of refusal-to-deal
cases different from the essential facilities category or whether the Court was inviting the application
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portant questions are left open for later refinement. These may include:
What business justifications count?37 How substantial must the business
justification be?38 Who bears the burden of proving a business justifica-
tion?39 To what extent must the rival's ability to compete be impaired?40
What is the role of defendant's intent in evaluating the likely effect of its
conduct and the adequacy of its business justification?4
The Court also did not address how the analysis of monopolization
should proceed in the event the defendant's business justification is ade-
quate.42 It appears that the Court intends to require an unstructured reason-
ableness review given that it suggested that a less restrictive alternative
analysis is incorporated into Sherman Act § 2. Under this approach, if an
adequate business justification removes the case from the Aspen/Kodak
of more general principles of antitrust analysis to unilateral refusals to deal.").
37 For example, two circuit courts have accepted a rebuttable presumption of a procompetitive
business justification when the monopolist unilaterally refuses to sell or license its intellectual property
rights. See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187; Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d
1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997).
38 The Court did not reach this question in Aspen Skiing, see supra note 19 and accompanying
text, and found the proffered justifications insufficient in Kodak. See supra notes 23-24 and accompa-
nying text. In another setting, proof of a substantial business justification, tantamount to the creation of
a new product, is necessary to remove conduct from the per se prohibition against horizontal agree-
ments on price. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) ("BM]").
39 In both decisions, the Court placed the burden of coming forward with a legitimate business
purpose on defendant. The Court did not address in Aspen Skiing whether plaintiff or defendant bears
the burden of persuasion about the sufficiency of the justification because the burden of coming for-
ward had not been met. Kodak appeared to place the burden of persuasion on defendant, without dis-
cussion. In contrast, the Areeda treatise places the burden of persuasion on plaintiff, based on pre-
Kodak decisions by lower courts. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, 658fl, at 123 & n.37.
40 That is, will any practice that raises rival's costs suffice? See supra note 9.
41 See generally Steven C. Salop, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards
and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 617 (1999) (advocating "primary purpose" test).
42 Moreover, there is no reason to think that the Supreme Court intended the Aspen/Kodak rule
to be the only truncated inquiry that could be conducted under Sherman Act §2. The Supreme Court
has, however, rejected one such possible rule since Kodak, holding that the attempted monopolization
offense requires more than proof of a bad act and specific intent to monopolize; plaintiff must also
show "dangerous probability of success" in achieving monopoly power. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993). This decision overruled a Ninth Circuit decision that had al-
lowed inference of likely anticompetitive effect in an attempted monopolization case from the other
two elements (i.e. had effectively refused to hear exculpatory evidence involving likely market effect
offered in defense).
43 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 & 605 n.32 (citing 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAW 78 (1978) with approval); cf. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 484-85 (finding one prof-
fered business justification insufficient because it would not justify most of the conduct under review).
The Ninth Circuit, in Image Technical Services Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., does not conclude other-
wise. 125 F.3d 1195, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 1997). The circuit court interpreted the jury instructions it
upheld as not permitting the jury to consider whether Kodak had less restrictive alternatives. Id. at
1213. Given that the court upheld a jury verdict against Kodak on those instructions, it did not reach
the question of whether liability could have been found on a theory that defendant had a less restrictive
way to achieve efficiencies. For an argument that less restrictive alternative analysis may be more
difficult to employ in the review of unilateral actions (under Sherman Act §2) than in the review of
collaborative conduct (under Sherman Act §1), see 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, 658f2.
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rule and leads to an unstructured reasonableness review, the monopolist's
conduct could still be found unlawful through either of two routes: (1) if
the harm to competition (in creating or protecting monopoly) outweighs
the efficiency justification, or (2) if the procompetitive benefits can rea-
sonably and practically be obtained with less harm to competition. Alter-
natively, the Court may be indicating merely that an inquiry into whether
the monopolist had a less restrictive way of achieving a legitimate business
purpose is an aid to characterizing the monopolist's conduct as a "bad act"
or not (rather than part of an effort to determine the reasonableness of that
conduct).' Under that interpretation, the less restrictive alternative ques-
tion goes only to whether the business justification is adequate, and the
acceptance of a justification as sufficient would operate as an absolute
defense. But the differences between the two approaches may be more in
their articulation than their substance. If the characterization inquiry evalu-
ates the adequacy of a business justification on a sliding scale (requiring a
more substantial showing the greater the likely harm to competition) and
incorporates a less restrictive alternative analysis, then the question of
whether defendant's conduct satisfies the "bad act" requirement amounts
to an unstructured reasonableness review.45
The rule of reason is not always easy to apply. But the suggestion
that doing so is beyond judicial "competence" when high-tech product
designs must be evaluated, put forward recently by a D.C. Circuit panel,'
cannot be taken at face value to the extent it calls on courts to disregard
their responsibility to decide cases arising under the law of the United
States.4 7 Moreover, the demands antitrust law places on the courts in
44 This is the position advocated in 3 AREEDA & HOvENKAMP, supra note 9, 658fl.
45 For example, the Areeda & Hovenkamp treatise finds it necessary to explain that certain
conduct ("aggressive but non-predatory pricing, higher output, improved product quality, energetic
market penetration, successful research and development, cost-reducing innovations, and the like")
ought "not to be considered exclusionary for §2 purposes even though they tend to exclude rivals and
may even create a monopoly." Id. I 651b. This approach appears to adopt a sliding scale (where the
business justifications for some practices are thought almost surely to outweigh the harm those prac-
tices create), and thus effectively to introduce an unstructured reasonableness analysis into the defini-
tion of a bad act.
46 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 949-50 & 950 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(concluding that a court's evaluation of a claim of integration in applying tying doctrine must be "nar-
row and deferential").
47 Courts properly exercise discretion not to impose unenforceable remedies, perhaps including
price regulation or other injunctions requiring ongoing judicial supervision. In an extreme case where
no practical remedy could exist, it would be appropriate not to find liability. See Donald F. Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
HARV. L. REV. 655, 669-73 (1962) (explaining that parallel pricing does not violate Sherman Act §1
even if prices are above the competitive level because the courts have no practical remedy); Richard
Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1564
(1969) (same). But the Microsoft panel did not make this argument, presumably because the possibility
of a remedy cannot be ruled out as a general matter. For example, a less restrictive alternative analysis
may help a court frame a remedy by focusing on what was practical and reasonable.
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evaluating the complex technical details of product design are no greater
than those routinely met by the judiciary elsewhere, as in patent infringe-
ment or products liability litigation. The appellate panel's concern about
judicial competence is therefore best interpreted as a plea to litigants to
educate courts by providing testimony of scientific experts, and as a sug-
gestion to lower courts that they seek out similar expertise when necessary.
While many questions about the Aspen/Kodak rule remain open,
one key issue has been settled: liability may be established without consid-
ering evidence on the effect of the monopolist's conduct on competition.
This understanding of Aspen Skiing and Kodak has been confirmed by two
circuit courts4" in monopolization cases.49 The First Circuit held that "a
monopolist's unilateral refusal to deal with its competitors (as long as the
refusal harms the competitive process) may constitute prima facie evi-
dence of exclusionary conduct in the context of a Section 2 claim," though
a monopolist may "rebut such evidence by establishing a valid business
justification for its conduct."50 The qualification that the refusal to deal
must "harm the competitive process" was not a vehicle for bringing in
evidence of harm to buyers; rather, it operated merely to ensure that the
refusal to deal was of a sort that could harm buyers by reducing rivalry
among sellers. 1 In addition, in affirming a jury verdict after Kodak was
48 In addition, a Fifth Circuit panel wrote an opinion defining exclusionary conduct as behavior
"that tends to exclude or restrict competition and is not supported by a valid business reason." Great
Western Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 63 F.3d 1378, 1385 (5th Cir. 1995), nodified,
74 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 1996). The court emphasized that "[i]njury to competition is NOT an element of
Section 2," although evidence of such injury "supports" a finding of exclusionary conduct, and evi-
dence of injury may be relevant to proof of damages. Id. at 1385 (emphasis in original). But the panel
withdrew this observation later, after realizing that the discussion was not necessary to decide the case
before it. See Great Western Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 74 F.3d 613, 614 (5th Cir.
1996).
49 The Areeda & Hovenkamp treatise also reads Aspen Skiing and Kodak this way. 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, 658fl ("Aspen appeared to approve a formulation that certain acts are
presumptively unlawful unless justified by some legitimate business purpose") (recommending a more
narrow reading); id. I 764e6 ("Kodak dicta indicate that once market power is found, any 'exclusion-
ary action' to 'maintain' or 'strengthen' a monopoly in a downstream market violates §2 unless justi-
fied by a legitimate business purpose.").
50 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183 (1st Cir. 1994). The
court defined a business justification as valid "if it relates directly or indirectly to the enhancement of
consumer welfare." Id. In their treatise, Areeda & Hovenkamp criticize this definition as too narrow. 3
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP treatise, supra note 9, 1 658f.
51 Thus, in discussing Aspen Skiing, the First Circuit panel termed the refusal to deal "exclusion-
ary" when it involved a refusal "to continue a presumably efficient 'pattern of distribution that had
originated in a competitive market and had persisted for several years,"' without mentioning the Su-
preme Court's review of evidence of harm to buyers. Data General, 36 F.3d at 1183. Moreover, in
rejecting defendant's invitation for it to accept that a unilateral refusal to license a copyright can never
constitute exclusionary conduct, the panel conducted a brief policy analysis of whether consumers
could be better off in the short term and long term as a result of the incentives created by such conduct,
and appeared to term that analysis a focus on "harm to the competitive process." Id. at 1184-85. In
short, the phrase "harm to the competitive process" appears intended to ensure that the term "exclu-
sionary" is not applied to refusals to deal that do not in fact impede or raise costs for rivals, and thus
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remanded for trial, the Ninth Circuit held that Sherman Act § 2 "prohibits
a monopolist from refusing to deal in order to create or maintain a monop-
oly absent a legitimate business justification. '"52
The absence of harm to competition as an element of the As-
pen/Kodak rule is not surprising from one perspective. Earlier Supreme
Court decisions under Sherman Act § 2 do not require proof of lowered
output, raised prices or other harm to competition,53 and the black letter
elements of the monopolization offense are limited to a "bad act" and mo-
nopoly power. But this feature of the rule is surprising from another per-
spective. In recent years, as part of antitrust's Chicago School revolution,
the Supreme Court has reshaped other antitrust rules to emphasize that the
antitrust laws are not concerned about harm to rivals absent harm to buy-
ers.54 Aspen Skiing and Kodak gave the Court an opportunity it did not
accept to read an injury to competition requirement into the identification
of a "bad act,"55 for example by seizing on the doctrinal distinction be-
tween a deliberate act of monopolization and a monopoly that results from
serving customers better.56 Instead, these decisions interrupted what one
commentary terms the "trend toward greater permissiveness" in Sherman
could not reduce competition for the monopolist.
52 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1209 (9th Cir. 1997).
Only the Sherman Act §2 claims were submitted to the jury, which found against Kodak on monopoli-
zation and attempted monopolization counts. The Ninth Circuit held that Aspen Skiing and Kodak did
not require that the refusal to deal involve something essential to the survival of the competitors. Id. at
1209, 1211. In an earlier post-Kodak decision, the Ninth Circuit had similarly concluded, based on
Aspen Skiing and Kodak, that "[a] monopolist can refuse to deal with its competitors only if there are
legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal." High Tech. Careers v. Mercury News, 996 F.2d 987,
990 (9th Cir. 1993).
53 See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 150 (1951) (proof of success not
required to make out Sherman Act §2 violation when exclusion of rival would automatically restore
dominant firm's monopoly and no efficiency justification was alleged) (monopolization case framed as
attempt to monopolize); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S 781, 810 (1946) ("neither
proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or potential com-
petitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization under the Sherman Act") (upholding con-
spiracy to monopolize, monopolization, and attempt to monopolize verdicts in violation of Sherman
Act §2).
54 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, (1977) (injured rival
lacks standing to challenge merger in action for damages if its injury results from increased competi-
tion).
55 This possibility is suggested by Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59
(1993), where the Court relied on an argument based on the purpose of the Sherman Act to determine
the meaning of one element of the attempt to monopolize offense: a "dangerous probability" of
achieving monopoly power. To defend incorporating an "injury to competition" element into the iden-
tification of a "bad act" in Aspen Skiing or Kodak, had it wished to do so, the Court could have made a
similar argument while also recalling the rule-of-reason roots of Sherman Act §2 doctrine.
56 The courts have long recognized that the exercise of monopoly power achieved by "superior
skill, foresight and industry" does not violate the Sherman Act. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Act § 2 cases since the mid-1970s,57 when the Supreme Court's antitrust
decisions began to adopt a Chicago School perspective.
If. DOMINANT FIRMS AND INNOVATION
The Aspen/Kodak rule promotes the ends of the antitrust laws by
fostering rivalry in industries with a dominant firm where innovation com-
petition is effectively "winner-take-all" and where fringe rivals are in a
collaborative or complementary (as well as competitive) relationship with
the dominant firm. Some economists have questioned the extent to which
competition promotes innovation, effectively calling into question whether
the antitrust prohibition against monopolization promotes innovation,
whether or not the antitrust doctrine incorporates a truncated review. Ac-
cordingly, this section begins by explaining why competition likely spurs
innovation when innovation competition is winner-take-all, both generally
and particularly in industries with a dominant firm where fringe rivals are
also collaborators or sellers of complements. The focus is on industries
where innovation is ongoing and rapid, so that competition centers pri-
marily on the development of new products-substitutes for the monopo-
lized product (including later generations) or goods complementary to it-
rather than price.58 The remainder of the section explains why a truncated
legal rule that looks to two readily observable factors, exclusion that ex-
ploits a complementary or collaborative relationship and the absence of a
satisfactory business justification, is likely to promote innovation compe-
tition in such industries.
A. Competition and Innovation
The economic question of whether competition or monopoly best
promotes innovation has long been disputed. Indeed, this question was at
issue in an important constitutional law case, Charles River Bridge v. War-
ren Bridge,59 decided a half century before the antitrust laws were enacted.
The Charles River Bridge was a monopolist. It had a franchise, conferred
by the Massachusetts legislature, to build and operate a toll bridge across
the Charles River. Building the bridge was a risky venture; for example,
this was the first bridge in New England built over an arm of the sea, and
there was serious concern that it would collapse in the winter from thawing
57 ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KoVAcic, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A
NUTSHELL 137 (4th ed. 1994).
58 The emphasis on product innovation is not intended to exclude the possibility that a new
generation product could have the same features as the current generation, while producing the product
at lower cost.
59 36U.S. (11 Pet.)420(1837).
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and freezing. The bridge turned out to be a successful venture, earning its
investors a profit.
The legal controversy arose more than forty years after the Charles
River Bridge was authorized, when the state legislature granted a compet-
ing franchise to the Warren Bridge. After the second bridge was erected,
the Charles River Bridge was no longer very profitable. The Charles River
Bridge challenged the legislature's franchise grant to its rival. It argued
that its franchise was exclusive, so the later legislative act violated the
Contract Clause of the Constitution (which forbids states from passing
laws "impairing the Obligation of Contracts"6°).
The Supreme Court held that Charles River Bridge's franchise
should be construed as nonexclusive absent express indication otherwise
from the state legislature. Had the Court done otherwise, one would "soon
find the old turnpike corporations awakening from their sleep, and calling
upon this Court to put down the improvements which have taken their
place. 61 In short, the Court in Charles River Bridge saw competition as a
spur to innovation, and monopoly as its enemy. This judgment shaped the
way American economic development proceeded thereafter, according to a
prominent legal historian.62
The argument about whether competition or monopoly best pro-
motes innovation has continued among economists. While it is widely
accepted that competition generally promotes low prices, the suggestion
that competition promotes innovation is more controversial.63 Indeed, Jo-
60 U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
61 Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 552-53 (Taney, C.J.). In dissent, Justice Story
pointed out that the grant of exclusivity helped spur innovation, because it created an incentive for
initial investment. Id. at 608 (Story, J., dissenting). Story's main concerns were to uphold common law
rules of statutory interpretation and protect private property rights. See generally JAMES MCCLELLAN,
JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 215-26 (1971).
62 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 130-39
(1977). Judge Learned Hand came down on the same side of the policy argument in Alcoa. "Many
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift
and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry a stimulant to indus-
trial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let
well enough alone." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
63 This article presumes that society is better off if a dominant firm and fringe firns are all
investing in the development of new products, relative to having only the dominant firm or only the
fringe firms invest. This presumption is reasonable for policymaking, given the common research
finding that the social return to investment in research and development is more than double the return
to the firms making the investment. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics of Technological
Innovation, in TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDUSTRY 311 (Bruce R. Guile & Harvey Brooks eds.,
1987); Jeffrey Bernstein & M. Ishaq Nadiri, Interindustry R&D Spillover, Rates of Return, and Pro-
duction in High-Tech Industries, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (1988). It is nevertheless possible, as a
matter of economic theory, to have too much innovative effort in an industry-essentially an excessive
scramble among fringe firms to replace a dominant firm-for much the same reason as it is possible to
have too much product variety. That is, the private benefits to research and development can exceed
the social benefits when firms see substantial profits not just in bringing attractive new products to
market, but also in taking business away from rivals.
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seph Schumpeter famously took the view that monopoly encourages inno-
vation.' The most plausible reason for this is that a monopolist may have
a greater ability to appropriate the value of its new ideas than would a firm
in a more competitive market.65 On the other hand, there is a theoretical
reason, associated with the work of Kenneth Arrow, to suppose that com-
petition, not monopoly, drives innovation. 66 A monopolist may have less to
gain from innovating. It could spend a great deal of money to lower cost,
improve quality, or develop new products, only to find that it does not get
much additional business as a result-because, unlike a competitor, it al-
ready has most of the business there is to get.67 Relatedly, a monopolist's
employees may resist innovations that would threaten the existing organ-
izational structure.
These theories, which framed the traditional debate about the con-
nection between market structure and innovation, are not necessarily in-
consistent. They can be rationalized as suggesting that competition pro-
motes innovation if the innovator can ensure reasonable appropriability
through means other than prior monopoly, for example, by relying upon
intellectual property protections." The empirical literature is consistent
64 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPErER, CAPITALISM, SoCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106 (1950). For sur-
veys of the economic literature on the Schumpeterian theory, see generally WILLIAM L. BALDWIN &
JOHN T. ScoTr, MARKET STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1987); Richard Gilbert &
Steven Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innova-
tion Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 574-76 (1995).
65 In addition, the literature defending the Schumpeterian view suggests that a monopolist may
have greater access to low cost internal finance or greater ability to take advantage of scale economies
in research and development. However, these are potential advantages of large firms, regardless of the
extent to which they face competition, and do not bear on a monopolist's actions except to the extent
monopoly happens to be correlated with firm size. Given that the markets commonly relevant to anti-
trust analysis (the minimum agglomeration of products necessary to permit successful collusion) are
typically more narrow than four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries, see Gregory
Werden, The Divergence of SIC Industries from Antitrust Markets: Some Evidence from Price Fixing
Cases, 28 ECON. LETTERS 193 (1988); Russell Pittman & Gregory Werden, The Divergence of SIC
Industries from Antitrust Markets: Indications from Justice Department Merger Cases, 33 ECON.
LETTERS 283 (1990); and given that there are many large multi-product firms, the correlation between
monopoly and firm size is unlikely to be high.
66 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144 (3d ed. 1976); see generally BALDWIN & SCOTT, supra
note 64; Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 64, at 574-76.
67 When applied to the dominant firm setting discussed below, the Arrow effect may be inter-
preted as suggesting that the dominant firm may prefer to accommodate fringe innovation, and perhaps
imitate it if successful, rather than seek to deter it. That is, the dominant firm may see its current rents
as worth protecting, notwithstanding that fringe firms are innovating in an effort to compete them
away. This may occur if innovation is more costly to the fringe than to the dominant firm, perhaps
because the dominant firm controls complementary products. See Jonathan B. Baker, Fringe Firms and
Incentives to Innovate, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 621, 637-38 (1995); see also infra note 72 (examples of
accomodation strategies).
68 Thus, the FrC is concerned with the loss of research streams aiming for new drug patents and
FDA approval. See, e.g., In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 62 Fed. Reg. 409 (Jan. 3, 1997) (analysis to aid public
comment).
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with this suggestion. Recent studies have undermined support for what
previously looked like a Schumpeterian tendency for highly concentrated
industries to be more innovative than moderately concentrated ones. The
older empirical generalization may be an artifact of biases in the most
common study design, and in any event the asserted Schumpeterian rela-
tionship largely disappears once the degree of appropriability across in-
dustries is controlled for.69 Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect innova-
tion competition to promote innovation when that competition is winner-
take-all, and thus when appropriability is not an issue.
Recent theoretical work about the determinants of innovative ef-
fort and the prospects for innovation success has begun to consider market
structures not at the extremes of monopoly and competition. In these mar-
kets, strategic behavior can be important. Markets with dominant (leading)
firms and fringe firms are particularly relevant to the present inquiry, be-
cause what antitrust calls a "monopoly" may be better described as a
dominant firm-that is, one with a large market share in a relevant market
into which entry is not easy.70 (The antitrust term can be misleading to the
extent it wrongly suggests the absence even of fringe rivalry.) An analysis
of the innovation incentives facing a dominant firm and its fringe rivals
suggests why the antitrust ban on monopolization promotes innovation
competition when competition is winner-take-all and fringe firms are col-
laborators as well as competitors.
In markets with a dominant firm, research and development
(R&D) investments can operate as strategic commitments, affecting the
rivalry between the leading firm and fringe firm. 7' The framework is
similar to analyses of entry deterrence. If a dominant firm makes commit-
ments (sunk investments) to deter fringe innovation by investing heavily in
its own R&D, then the dominant firm will become the primary source of
new products, and fringe firms will find it more profitable to imitate
proven leading firm innovations than seek to innovate first. On the other
hand, if this deterrence strategy is too costly and risky, the dominant firm
may instead choose to accommodate fringe innovation.7 2 Here, fringe
69 See generally Baker, supra note 67, at 640 n.89.
70 It is worth emphasizing that a large market share does not necessarily reflect the ability to
exercise market power. As is well known, firms can achieve high market shares for a host of reasons,
many commendable. The good reasons may include, for example, developing a superior product,
managing production efficiently to keep costs low, and responding to changes in customer preferences.
Moreover, achieving a high market share in a relevant market does not necessarily confer the ability to
exercise market power-to reduce output and raise price--even if the market is properly defined from
a demand-side perspective. A high share of a relevant market allows a dominant finm to exercise mar-
ket power only if new supply-fringe expansion or de novo entry-would not be forthcoming in
sufficient amounts to counteract or deter the anticompetitive conduct.
71 This paragraph summarizes a more extensive discussion in Baker, supra note 67, at 634-39.
72 Large firms may indeed pursue accommodation strategies; this is how the major U.S. auto-
makers probably behaved during the 1960s and 1970s. See id. at 634-39. Nintendo also apparently
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firms will innovate first and grow in significance over time, while the
dominant firm will take short-term profits and allow its market position to
erode. The considerations are similar whether the innovative effort is
aimed at creating a substitute for the monopolized product (including a
later generation) or a complementary good.
As a matter of economic theory, it is impossible to say for certain
whether enforcement of the antitrust prohibition against monopolization,
which might restrict the conduct of a dominant firm, will on balance en-
hance or reduce aggregate industry innovation in general. The most direct
effect is to lessen the value of innovation to the dominant firm, reducing its
incentive to innovate, while increasing the value of innovation to fringe
firms, raising their incentive to innovate.73 Moreover, an antitrust rule that
enhances fringe incentives to innovate could induce a dominant firm to
adopt an accommodation strategy when it would otherwise have chosen a
deterrence strategy. Such a switch in strategy could generate a substantial
reduction in the dominant firm's innovative effort. For both reasons, the
dominant firm may seek to innovate less while the fringe firms seek to
innovate more. Accordingly, the net effect of the bar on monopolization on
both industry-wide innovative effort and the prospects for innovation suc-
cess in the general dominant firm setting, considering both dominant firm
and fringe firms, is unclear as a matter of economic theory.
When innovation competition is winner-take-all and fringe firms
are in a collaborative or complementary relationship with the dominant
firm as well as competitors, it is possible to say more. To see why, con-
sider the following hypothetical example based loosely on the U.S. pho-
tography industry in the 1960s and 1970s. 74 Assume that Kodak is a domi-
nant firm in both the camera and film markets, though there is a competi-
tive fringe in each market. In addition, Kodak provides photofinishing
services in a competitive market for that product.
Berkey and Kodak are competing to develop a new film with su-
perior qualities. The firms both expect that one film product will come to
dominate the market, primarily because consumers do not have a strong
demand for product variety and retailers find it costly (in terms of shelf
space usage and restocking) to carry multiple lines of film. Berkey brings
its product to market first. Kodak responds by making its new camera
models consistent only with film packaged in a new format. It licenses that
format to other camera manufacturers but not to other film manufacturers
followed an accommodation strategy in its competition with Sega. See ADAM M. BRANDENBERGER &
BARRY J. NALEBUFF, Co-oPETITION 237-41 (1996).
73 Cf. Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and Intellectual Properly Law
on Compatibility and Innovation, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 609 (1999) (analyzing effects of policies to
encourage compatibility with the dominant firm).
74 The actual facts are recounted in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1979).
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such as Berkey. The new format is not significantly better or cheaper than
the old one.
Fringe firms manufacturing cameras follow Kodak in switching
their new products to the new film format; they think this is where the
market is going. One fringe firm seeks to expand camera sales by con-
tinuing to produce for the old format and advertising the compatibility of
its product with Berkey's new film, but it does not capture a large share of
the new camera market. Over time, more and more of the cameras that
consumers own will be incompatible with Berkey's new film.
Some time later, Kodak introduces its own new and improved film
product. Kodak sells that product in both the old format and the new for-
mat (unavailable to Berkey). Kodak's new film product quickly achieves a
high share of sales in the film market, comparable to Kodak's dominant
market share prior to Berkey's innovation.
The facts in the hypothetical example have been invented to take
away some competitive advantages a Berkey might actually have in the
marketplace and to exclude some defenses a Kodak could employ.
Berkey's intellectual property rights did not block Kodak's innovation; the
two firms found different ways to achieve a similar result. Berkey could
not practically evade the exclusionary effect of Kodak's practice by team-
ing up with a fringe camera manufacturer. Berkey could not hope to split
the market with Kodak; Kodak did not license Berkey even after Kodak
had succeeded and the innovation competition is close to winner-take-all.
Berkey did not keep its first-mover advantage for long. And Kodak had no
good business justification for changing film format. The point of the ex-
ample is not that the hypothetical Kodak will invariably be able to prevent
Berkey's success, and not that Berkey's failure would necessarily be the
result of anticompetitive practices. Rather, the example is a vehicle for
illustrating the kind of incentives that can be expected to operate in win-
ner-take-all industries, and the kind of tools a dominant firm can use to
exclude when its rivals are also collaborators or sellers of complementary
products.
If Berkey knows that the odds were stacked against it as far as
they are in the hypothetical example, because Kodak can add to the natural
advantages that its reputation confers by altering its camera format, Berkey
might reasonably choose not to attempt to create a new film in the first
place. But if Kodak knows that Sherman Act § 2 prohibits it from re-
sponding to Berkey's new product by creating an incompatible camera and
film format, then Kodak probably still has a strong incentive to try to de-
velop a new film itself. The prize for success is too big, even in the setting
of the hypothetical, without strong network externalities. Accordingly, in
this case it is reasonable to expect that enforcement of an antitrust rule
against monopolization would enhance Berkey's incentives to innovate
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substantially without markedly reducing Kodak's incentives, and thus lead
to more innovative effort in aggregate and greater prospects for innovation
success.
75
The hypothetical example suggests two important points. First,
even when the dominant firm would have sought to innovate aggressively,
absent a prohibition on monopolization, it is unlikely that the dominant
firm's innovation incentives would decline substantially as a consequence
of antitrust enforcement in industries where innovation competition has
strong winner-take-all properties. Second, antitrust enforcement can make
a big difference to rivals when the dominant firm is exploiting a collabora-
tive or complementary relationship to exclude them. Enforcement of anti-
trust's prohibition against monopolization thus can be expected to encour-
age fringe firm innovative effort without markedly discouraging dominant
firm innovative effort when innovation competition is winner-take-all and
the dominant firm takes advantage of a complementary or collaborative
relationship to exclude.
These conclusions appear to be general. When innovation compe-
tition is winner-take-all, that property means that the prize to innovation,
from the point of view of the dominant firm, is likely to be large whether
or not the antitrust laws prohibit monopolization.76 When the expected
reward is large-the important case for policy analysis 77-that reward is
75 In an extreme case, where the dominant firm's advantages (perhaps derived from its installed
base) make innovation an uphill battle for fringe firms even with such a policy, the rule may make
little difference to aggregate innovation incentives. But even then, it is not likely to reduce aggregate
innovative efforts and aggregate prospects for innovation success.
76 A related argument derives from the suggestion that incentives to innovate turn less on the
expected prize than on the possibility of receiving a very large prize-that innovation is encouraged
primarily by a "fat tail" in the distribution of probable awards to research and development. F. M.
Scherer, The Innovation Lottery (April 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). If so, an
antitrust policy like the antitrust prohibition on monopolization may make little difference to dominant
firm incentives to innovate, because a fat upper tail in the distribution of probable awards is likely to
remain (albeit shifted roughly uniformly toward lower returns). (On the other hand, fringe firms may in
theory become more reluctant to innovate. They would recognize that the rule would affect their re-
turns only if they became so successful as to become dominant, thus reducing only the upper tail of
their distribution of possible rewards. This latter incentive is unlikely to be important; if it were, the
loudest complaints about aggressive Sherman Act §2 enforcement would come from fringe firms, not
dominant firms.)
77 If the prize is small, so that a small reduction in the dominant firm's incentives could plausi-
bly lead the dominant firm not to pursue the innovation, the innovation itself is unlikely to have great
social value. That is not to say there is no welfare loss from discouraging dominant firm research and
development aimed at small innovations. A small innovation will, in general, be more beneficial to
society if introduced by a firm with a large market share than if introduced by a firm with a small
market share, because more buyers will benefit. But the aggregate welfare calculus of an antitrust rule
governing the behavior of dominant firms is likely to be driven by the effects of the rule on incentives
to pursue large innovations. If antitrust policy can energize fringe firms to pursue large innovations
without markedly discouraging the dominant firm's innovative activity, and more innovation is so-
cially beneficial, then that policy is likely welfare enhancing even if the dominant firm is discouraged
from pursuing some small innovations.
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likely to be the primary determinant of the dominant firm's research and
development expenditures.7" In other words, it is unlikely that small re-
ductions in the expected return to the dominant firm would make much
difference to that firm's innovative effort and prospects for innovation
success, so long as the total reward remains large.79 The winner-take-all
feature also means that an ex ante monopoly is unnecessary to ensure ex
post appropriability of the value of new ideas.
In addition, the complementary or collaborative relationship be-
tween the dominant firm and its fringe rivals suggests that an antitrust pro-
hibition on monopolization is not likely to tip the dominant firm's incen-
tives from deterrence to accommodation." Such a relationship can be ex-
pected often to give the dominant firm access to tools for impeding the
success of a fringe firm's new product,81 such as creating incompatibilities
or limiting access to collaborative activities, that the dominant firm would
employ only in response to fringe firm innovation success.82 For example,
the dominant firm might engage in actions like refusing to license intel-
78 The length and scope of intellectual property protection will affect the size of the prize, for
example, by affecting the ability of the innovator to appropriate the benefit of successive (follow-on)
innovation by rivals, but not in any way that is likely to vary with the nature of the antitrust rule con-
cerning monopolization.
79 It is plausible that a small increase in the probability of success has a greater marginal effect
on fringe firm investments in research and development than on dominant firm investments. If research
and development investments are strategic substitutes, an increase in fringe firm investment may lead
to an even greater reduction in dominant firm R&D. See Jeremy I. Bulow et al., Multimarket Oligop-
oly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. POL. ECON. 488 (1985). This consideration, too, is
likely to matter least toward explaining dominant firm innovation incentives in markets where innova-
tion competition is winner-take-all.
80 The potential for an antitrust rule against monopolization to reduce aggregate industry inno-
vative effort and innovation success derives from the possibility that the dominant firm's incentives to
innovate would decline so much as to outweigh the spur to the fringe firms. The primary concern arises
if, as is assumed in the text, the dominant firm would otherwise have pursued an aggressive innovation
strategy rather than a strategy of accommodating fringe innovation. (If instead, absent antitrust, the
dominant firm would have decided not to invest in innovation, preferring to react later in the event the
fringe were to succeed, an antitrust rule that discourages the dominant firm from impeding fringe firm
innovation efforts would be unlikely to reduce the dominant firm's already low innovative effort sub-
stantially.)
81 This discussion assumes that the dominant firm will seek to exclude a successful fringe firm
rather than co-opting it (through acquisition or licensing its technology), either because the antitrust
laws would not prohibit this conduct or because the dominant firm could not commit to the latter
strategy at the time of the initial investment decisions.
82 The general conditions under which exclusionary strategies would profit a firm are discussed
in Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of
"Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517 (1996). Intertemporal scope economies or
demand complementarities, which are often features of innovating high-technology industries, can
make it more profitable for a firm to participate in the complementary market in the future if it was
also active in that market in the present, providing one mechanism by which the dominant firm's
exclusionary efforts can succeed in raising the costs of the excluded rival. See Dennis W. Carlton &
Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving
Industries (Sept. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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lectual property, closing standards or changing product designs.83 Exclu-
sionary actions such as these may be particularly effective in impeding
fringe success when they deny fringe firm innovators the ability to gain the
critical mass needed for success in network industries, 4 or when they cre-
ate expectations among buyers about the success of the dominant firm's
product that are divorced from product performance."
When the dominant firm can exploit a complementary or collabo-
rative relationship to exclude in this way, doing so need not be expensive
for it, in part because it can defer doing so until after observing whether
the fringe firm has successfully created a new product.86 It may believe
that if it brings the new product to market first, its advantages from domi-
nance in the current product may give it an unbeatable head start in win-
ning the race for the new prize (even assuming the fringe firm's innovation
does not infringe on dominant firm intellectual property),87 thus permitting
the dominant firm to avoid costly expenditures on creating incompatibili-
ties or otherwise hindering the fringe firm.88 Moreover, the dominant firm
may be unable to determine how to impede its rival's innovation before it
learns the details of the fringe firm's new product.
In sum, when the dominant firm can exploit collaborative or com-
plementary relationships to impede fringe firm innovation success, the
dominant firm likely has access to tools whose use would reduce the prof-
83 These kind of exclusionary actions are suggested by the allegations in antitrust cases involv-
ing dominant fin innovation. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co, 603 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1979); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
affid sub nom Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983); Litton Sys. v.
AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983). In contrast, factors inhibiting fringe firm success that do not rely
on collaboration or complements, like the dominant firm's installed base or reputation, or information
advantage from dominating the current generation product, might be thought to affect the value of the
fringe firm generally, regardless of whether the fringe firm successfully innovates.
84 See generally Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 673
(1999).
85 Thus, the other participants in the industry need not line up in favor of the fringe firm's prod-
uct even if that product performs better than the dominant firm's product. See generally Farrell & Katz,
supra note 73 (highlighting the self-fulfilling nature of expectations in network industries).
86 Waiting even later, until the dominant firm were sure of its own innovation success, may be
too late, for example, because those buyers who are most concerned about incompatibilities would
have already switched to the fringe firm's new product, and it would be prohibitively costly for the
dominant firm to force them to switch again.
87 This advantage may derive from a scope economy or a complementarity in demand that
operates to give the dominant firm a strategic advantage in the new market, regardless of whether the
new product is the next generation of the current product or a complement for the current product. (If
the targeted innovation is a next generation product, such scope economies or complementarities
would be intertemporal.)
88 These costs may include the direct expenditures on impeding the successful fringe firm, lost
benefits of collaboration, and lost goodwill with customers with customers or firms selling comple-
ments, for example. The point is not that there are no costs to the dominant firm; it is that the dominant
firm need not make those expenditures unless the fringe firm succeeds in bringing the targeted new
product to market, and perhaps not unless the fringe firm succeeds first.
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itability of the fringe firm's new product much more than it would cost the
dominant firm. Hence, the antitrust prohibition on monopolization would
operate in practice by limiting the dominant firm's use of such tools to
exclude; that would be deemed the "bad act.",89 Under such circumstances,
Sherman Act § 2 would plausibly operate surgically: to remove an impor-
tant inhibition on fringe firm innovation without interfering with the pri-
mary determinant of the dominant firm's incentive to innovate, the winner-
take-all "prize."
B. Innovation Competition and the Aspen/Kodak Rule
Given that the antitrust prohibition against monopolization likely
promotes innovation when competition is winner-take-all and the domi-
nant firm exploits collaborative of complementary relationships to exclude
fringe rivals, why should antitrust employ the Aspen/Kodak rule, a trun-
cated analysis of monopolization that does not consider harm to buyers?
The short answer is that the two key elements of the AspenKodak rule-
the requirement that the dominant firm exploit a complementary or collabo-
rative relationship to exclude and the absence of a satisfactory business
justification-are reliable and readily observable guides to how the anti-
trust analysis would come out without truncation, while the unstructured
analysis is probably more difficult to apply. 9°
If the dominant firm is in a complementary or collaborative rela-
tionship with its fringe firm rivals, it likely has access to tools for imped-
ing the success of a fringe firm's new product, such as creating incompati-
bilities or limiting access to collaborative activities, that it can employ to
great effect at relatively little expense and with little bearing on its own
innovation efforts or prospects for innovation success. If it exploits those
tools to exclude, harm to competition is likely to result. On the other hand,
a successful collaboration may require some restrictions on the conduct of
the partners. For example, the dominant firm may be concerned about lim-
iting its partners' incentives to free ride on the services or information it
contributes to the collaborative activity or system of complementary prod-
ucts.9 ' Or the dominant firm may wish to protect against opportunistic
89 For a similar reason, a court can likely devise a practical remedy when the dominant firm
exploits a complementary or collaborative relationship to exclude, thus addressing Judge Posner's
concern about pursuing Sherman Act §2 cases involving unilateral refusals to deal. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAw 211 (1976).
90 These elements thus satisfy the conditions for good truncated rules discussed supra at note 6
and accompanying text.
91 It may not be clear how this concern could arise in the case of complementary products (not
an express collaboration). Suppose a system of complementary goods would benefit (in competition
with other systems) from all firms' upgrading the quality of their components simultaneously. If one
firm does so on its own, the others may recognize that their sales may increase substantially even if
they do not also invest in improvements. The first firm could seek to make its product incompatible
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bargaining by its collaborators after the dominant firm has made substan-
tial sunk investments. The other element of the Aspen/Kodak rule, the ab-
sence of an adequate business justification, helps guarantee that the exclu-
sionary actions are harmful by ruling out the possibility that they are
needed to make collaboration possible.92
An unstructured analysis of whether the dominant firm's conduct
harms competition would also consider evidence as to the likely or actual
effect of that behavior. That approach would add to the difficulty and cost
of judicial review. Harm to competition is probably more difficult to
evaluate than the adequacy of the business justification, even in prospect,
and particularly in the dominant firm setting, where the fringe is already
weak. And when competition can quickly tip the market to a winner, as
when network externalities are important, waiting to find out whether a
business practice harms competition may well mean that antitrust inter-
vention occurs too late to remedy any competitive problem.
Ill. THE ASPEN/KODAK RULE IN OTHER INDUSTRY SETTNGS
The previous section analyzed the likely performance of the As-
pen/Kodak rule in one industry setting, where competition is a winner-
take-all tournament involving the introduction of new products. But this is
not the only setting where a dominant firm is in collaborative or comple-
mentary relationships with its fringe rivals, and thus where the rule might
come into play. One possibility is that price competition predominates.93
Another is that innovation competition would not be winner-take-all. This
section evaluates the AspenKodak rule in its broader application by taking
a more general perspective on competition between dominant firms and
fringe rivals who also are collaborators and sellers of complements. 94
with low quality complementary components in part for this reason, though there may be other ways of
preventing free riding that do not restrict competition so much.
92 Similarly, were the business justification defense omitted from the Aspen/Kodak rule, then the
charge that Aspen Skiing and Kodak discourage monopolists from undertaking procompetitive business
collaborations (for fear that a court would forbid termination) would be more credible. See GELLHORN
& KOVACIC, supra note 57, at 147. Cf Areeda, supra note 25, at 850-52 (advocating that courts read a
legitimate business justification defense into the essential facilities doctrine, on the model of Aspen
Skiing).
93 The Aspen/Kodak rule was articulated in cases involving markets where price competition
was mainly at issue. Downhill skiing in particular was not characterized by winner-take-all innovation
competition.
94 A collaborative or complementary relationship between a dominant firm and its excluded
rival could arise in many ways, including the following four. The firms may produce a new product
collectively, as in Aspen Skiing. One may produce parts and service while the other only provides
service, as in Kodak. One may be vertically integrated into distribution, while the other only manufac-
tures upstream. Or one may produce a full set of complementary products (like personal computers and
printers), while the other produces a partial set (only printers).
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Several policy concerns favor the Aspen/Kodak rule in its broader
application. One traditional antitrust concern applies to all efforts by mo-
nopolists to exclude actual or potential rivals. Each rival or potential en-
trant, however small, represents a lingering hope that competition in the
market can be restored. Rivals may appear competitively insignificant if
the industry has a dominant firm, but there are no better situated rivals to
constrain the monopolist. Hence, careful scrutiny of exclusionary conduct
by a dominant firm, no matter how small the harmed rivals, helps preserve
competitive possibilities for the future.
Moreover, when the fringe rivals are also in a complementary re-
lationship with the dominant firm, regardless of whether it is they or the
dominant firm (or both) who participates in the complementary market or
in a collaborative relationship with the dominant firm, two additional con-
cerns about exclusion may arise. The first is that the collaboration may
give the monopolist convenient and effective instruments for exclusion;
this possibility was emphasized in the previous section. For example, the
monopolist may be able to threaten to cut off its rival's access to the mo-
nopolized product, harming the rival's complementary business. Or it may
threaten to end a collaboration (restrict its rival's access to the comple-
mentary product), harming the rival's efforts to compete directly with the
dominant firm. Indeed, a fringe rival that depends on a dominant firm for a
complementary product, produces a complementary product to the mo-
nopolized good, or collaborates with the dominant firm, may be peculiarly
susceptible to pressure by the dominant firm exploiting that relationship.
In addition, any firm that produces a complement (whether or not
it is also a rival to the dominant firm) may have an important role to play
in fostering competition and innovation in monopolized markets because it
may have a leg up in helping a fringe rival in the monopoly market enter
or expand.95 Its existence may make it unnecessary for a new firm seeking
to challenge the monopolist or a fringe rival seeking to expand to engage
in more difficult "two level" entry.96 Furthermore, sellers of product com-
plements have an incentive to help make the monopoly market more com-
petitive. This is because output restrictions in the monopolized market, as
from the exercise of monopoly power, reduce sales of the complementary
product. 97 The incentive of the sellers of product complements to encour-
age competition in the monopolized market is particularly great for a firm
with a large share of the market for the complementary good; under such
95 See David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Buyers' Strategies, Entry Barriers, and Competi-
tion, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 418 (1992).
96 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, §4.21 (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Reports (CCH) 13,103 (June 29, 1984) (a vertical merger may harm competition by raising entry
barriers, as entry may then be required at two levels).
97 See Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transformation of
the Hospital Industry, 51 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 131-34 (1988).
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circumstances, it can expect to appropriate most of the resulting benefit to
the complementary market.98 And if the complementary market has a
dominant firm that differs from the dominant firm controlling the initial
market, each has an additional incentive to promote competition in the
other market: success in doing so would allow the remaining dominant
firm to appropriate all the rents from exercising market power in the sys-
tem of complementary products taken as a whole, instead of sharing those
rents with a monopolist at some other level of competition.99 In these
ways, sellers of complements may, in part, substitute for sellers of substi-
tutes as the engine of competition with a monopoly. Thus, sellers of com-
plements may play an important role in policing a dominant firm, particu-
larly when fringe rivals are not strong competitive threats on their own.
These incentives may have as much impact on rivalry in developing better
products and production processes, as on price competition.
Other policy concerns do not favor general application of the As-
pen/Kodak rule, however. First, close scrutiny of a dominant firm's con-
duct can raise that firm's costs of achieving efficiencies. Indeed, antitrust
rules that restrict the dominant firm in its efforts to lower costs or improve
products risk denying the dominant firm's customers-who are, after all,
most of the customers in the marketplace-the benefits of efficiencies the
dominant firm would otherwise have achieved. But this concern is limited
given that the Aspen/Kodak rule finds liability only when the dominant
firm does not have a sufficient business justification for its actions.
Second, the collaboration may also create new opportunities for
the rival to free ride on the dominant firm's investments, and thus poten-
tially provide an efficiency justification for some exclusionary actions by
the dominant firm. This concern, too, is limited by the element of the As-
pen/Kodak rule requiring the absence of an adequate justification for the
dominant firm's conduct.
Third, any antitrust prohibition against monopolization can dis-
courage a dominant firm from innovating. Although, as discussed above,
this concern is limited when innovation competition is winner-take-all, it
may prove more substantial in other industry settings. Indeed, when the
goal is to promote innovation, it is difficult to devise a general rule appro-
priate to the circumstances of all industries." But the general concern
98 This point is related to the efficiencies that result from ending "double marginalization" (the
transfer of an intermediate good at a price in excess of marginal cost). See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON
& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 526 (1990) (The double markup "pro-
vides an incentive for firms to either vertically integrate or use vertical restrictions to promote effi-
ciency and thereby increase joint profits.").
99 Cf. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 11, at 10 (1999). ("It's in the interest of [Intel or Micro-
soft] to create multiple sources for its partner's piece of the system but to prevent the emergence of a
strong rival for its own piece.").
100 Baker, supra note 67, at 640-41.
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about reducing the innovative effort of a dominant firm, and its prospects
for innovation success, is unlikely to be great when the dominant firm
would, in the absence of antitrust enforcement, pursue an accommodation
strategy rather than aggressively seek to innovate. 1 In the remaining
case-aggressive dominant firm pursuit of innovation, with innovation
competition not winner-take-all-the likely welfare consequences of the
prohibition on monopolization are less clear. Even there, however, the
disincentive to dominant firm innovation could be more than counterbal-
anced by the increased innovation incentives of fringe firms, so it is possi-
ble that aggregate industry innovation will be enhanced.
The Aspen/Kodak rule addresses the threat to competition that may
arise in any industry when a dominant firm excludes fringe rivals who are
in a collaborative or complementary relationship with it, without an ade-
quate business justification. Practices condemned under the rule are gener-
ally likely to harm competition, and the application of the rule allows anti-
trust to reach them reliably while avoiding the difficulty of proving likely
effect on competition. In addition, the rule likely promotes innovation
when applied to govern dominant firm conduct where innovation competi-
tion is winner-take-all, and may or may not spur innovation otherwise. The
Aspen/Kodak rule thus appears likely to reduce the transactions costs of
operating the judicial system, relative to an unstructured review of domi-
nant firm conduct, without markedly increasing judicial errors.
101 See supra note 80.
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